

## NORWAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

BY

COLONEL YNGVE ODLO  
Norwegian Army

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# USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## NORWAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

by

Colonel Yngve Odlo  
Norwegian Army

Colonel Lee Deremer  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **ABSTRACT**

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The international system changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War, and for a period of time there do not seem to be any direct threat against Norwegian territory or independence. Norway's security approach has changed from a mainly domestic and northern Europe focus, to a global perspective. To achieve political goals, the Norwegian armed forces has been transformed from a huge mobilization structure to a small, high quality and highly mobile force structure, able to conduct operations throughout the world as part of multinational organizations. My thesis is that current political goals exceed the political will to maintain a balanced and sustainable force structure. Norway should now prioritize the contribution to ongoing operations, make adjustments to the national force generating process and establish a policy where all elements of power are used in synergy. An enhanced cooperation between NATO and EU and a more consistent cooperation within NATO between small nations are recommended. I will discuss the international system, relevant parts of Norwegian policy, and present force structure and force generating system. Lastly, I will recommend adjustments to reduce the gap between political will and armed capacity.



## NORWAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or present are certain to miss the future.

—President John F. Kennedy<sup>1</sup>

During the Cold War Norway's main interest was to maintain territorial sovereignty on the northern flank of NATO. Use of military force to support Norwegian foreign policy on other continents was secondary, and most of the time conducted by reserve units, generated for one mission only. Today world wide operations is a primary mission for all units, and the armed forces has the last 10 years been transformed to enable world wide operations as part of multinational force structures. Norwegian defense and security policy have changed from a national, and mainly internal, approach to a global perspective. At the same time the political goals to contribute to international operations are higher than the will to maintain a balanced and sustainable force structure. What is Norwegian policy and are the political goals in accordance with the international system of the 21<sup>st</sup> century?

Transformation of military force structures is a slow process, and today's situation with highly overstretched units, is probably both the result of an unfinished transformation, a mismatch between political ends and means, and a need to adjust some of the ways. My intent is to discuss the Army force generating process, and the ability to become more sustainable and maintain relevance for future operations. A more consistent cooperation with other countries and multinational force structures has to be assessed as a way to become more sustainable. Norwegian interests have always affected other nation states interests which also seem to be the situation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.



Multinational cooperation has therefore a double edge; it has to increase the efficiency to conduct ongoing operations and remain national ability and flexibility for the future situations. One of CoS Norwegian Army's main principles is to train as you fight<sup>2</sup>, and I believe there is a distinct potential to improve the national force generating process to become more effective and sustainable. A culture based on knowledge and effective teams must be the main goal, and the effect of each person will be more important than ever to achieve the common goals. The balance between current efficiency and future requirements will change, and must be measured with the need for a more consistent multinational cooperation. The quote from John F. Kennedy has proved its reliability, and the most difficult part will be to accept that our prediction of the future today needs adjustments tomorrow.

### The International System in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

The end of the Cold War changed the international security environment dramatically, and President George Bush described in 1991<sup>3</sup> his vision for the future.

We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.

The international system consists of a number of actors and their connections, mutual reliance and interaction seems to be more complicated to understand than ever. During the Cold War the situation was more predictable with the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the U.S., as dominant actors in a bipolar system, and for a small nation state the policy was determined of which side you belonged. The end of the Cold War left Norway and the allied nation states without any visible enemy or direct threat against national territory, which combined with the ongoing globalization have led to more

flexible and dynamic relations between the actors in the international system<sup>4</sup>. Will the international organizations as United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) remain major actors in the international system? Who is going to have the authority to govern the conduct of nations? These are vital questions to understand the international system in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and its affect on Norwegian policy.

The birth of UN in 1945 was a result of two world wars and a common understanding of the need for an organization above the nation states as main actor in the international security environment. The organization has evolved with the changing environment, and questions may be asked whether the UN has the ability to remain a world wide security organization or not. Lessons learned from UN operations make the challenges visible for everyone. As most of the international organizations, the effectiveness of the UN depends on each nation state's willingness to contribute, and founded on the principle of consensus – one member of the Security Council may stop any good intention. One of the core issues is the nation state's position in the international system of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Thomas W. McShane outlines this question of sovereignty, and I do support his assessment that sovereignty is likely to remain as a critical component of the international system<sup>5</sup>. The result of a changing international environment will force the future strategic leaders to have a more global approach. No station state, the U.S. included, will have the capabilities required to go it alone over time, and multilateral actions will be preferred in foreseeable future. The former UN Secretary, Kofi Annan, describe the changing nature of the nation state in an exemplary way.

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their people, not vice versa<sup>6</sup>.

The UN has launched several processes to reform its way of working in order to become a reliable and effective actor in the international system. The High-Level Panel on Threats suggested in 2004 several actions to make the UN a more effective actor in the security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century<sup>7</sup>. The main content goes both to restore the UN credibility and to create a better collaboration with regional organizations. Roger H. Palin goes even further, and states that the UN is unfit to conduct operations that exceed peace-keeping missions<sup>8</sup>. At the same time, everyone seems to agree that there is a huge need of someone to legitimate necessary action, including use of force, and the UN appears to be the only organization with world wide credibility and potential to do so.

NATO was born a few years later than the UN, also as a result of two world wars and the need to stabilize the European environment and deter Russia and the expansion of the eastern European communist block. The organization was built on the principle of collective security, vital for all nation states facing an increased tension to the Soviet Union's expansion. The end of both world wars, and a peace based on human rights and democratic development, was only possible with the involvement of the U.S. This involvement in European affairs remained vital during the Cold War, and as such NATO played a vital role. Today NATO has evolved into the new environment, and both Seyom Brown<sup>9</sup> and Raymond A Millen<sup>10</sup> rightfully question whether NATO is going to remain as a major actor in the international security system.

To catch up with the changing environment, NATO has launched several reforms. The organization has been enlarged to a total of 26 countries, and includes most of the former European members of the Warsaw Pact<sup>11</sup>. For the new countries, the principle of collective security has been vital to start the long way to become sovereign and democratic states. NATO force structure is being transformed to meet new requirements, both with regard to command and control<sup>12</sup> and available and flexible force structures as NATO Response Force (NRF)<sup>13</sup>. At the same time, the ongoing operation in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates the challenges an organization based on consensus is up to in a dynamic environment with increased need for flexibility<sup>14</sup>. There is no doubt that the effect of NATO rely on the involvement of the U.S., and I do believe that both the U.S. and the European countries will have common interests to maintain the mutual reliance and a close cooperation in foreseeable future. NATO has the potential to maintain arena for this vital transatlantic cooperation, but the need for flexibility will evolve NATO into a fixed frame where timely coalitions may be formed to meet upcoming challenges.

The EU is the third pillar in the European security environment. The organization has evolved from an arena of economic cooperation to become a forceful player in the international system. European countries face common threats, and the EU has increased its focus on security matters, including a separate European security strategy<sup>15</sup>. The development has so far been in support of, and in close cooperation with, NATO, and further development seems to depend on NATO's ability to adapt to the 21<sup>st</sup> century's requirements. In that case, the U.S. interests in European development plays a vital role, and as long as these interests are of important value,

NATO is the only arena where the U.S. may influence directly on the future development. If NATO fails, the situation may deteriorate, but so far I do not believe that will happen.

In an environment of increased globalization, there is an increased need to legitimize actions and the use of force in the international system, and UN is the only organization with any potential to do so. I believe that the international system will develop on existing values and principles, but with a dramatically different dynamic and need of flexible solutions and cooperation between the nation states. Nation states will remain as main actors, but the dominant role will change to serve the population and not vice versa. NATO will maintain the existing principle of collective security, and in addition evolve into an arena where timely coalitions may be created. In this system I believe small nations have to establish a more consistent cooperation to become reliable partners and members of future coalitions and alliances.

### Norwegian Policy

Retired Admiral Jacob Boeressen states that Norway is a small state with interests like a superpower<sup>16</sup>, and reading the history, many international actors have had conflicting interests with Norway. Nearly 400 years in a more or less forced union with Denmark and Sweden, German occupation during World War II and as a neighbor to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today the Arctic areas are on the agenda again, a result of global warming and an increased battle of energy<sup>17</sup>.

Like other western democracies, Norway's interests are to protect the citizens, welfare, environment and system of economy and national resources<sup>18</sup>. Norway's way of living and superior welfare system is based on the huge resources of oil and gas,

fisheries within the 200 nautical mile economic zone and availability of fresh water for several purposes. All interests are highly valuable for other actors and our access to these resources is based on agreements and the principle of international law. The main goals of Norwegian security policy are therefore to protect sovereignty and maintain political freedom of action, in a stable regional environment where disputes are solved in accordance with international law<sup>19</sup>. In these contexts, major international organizations as UN and NATO play a vital role, together with the historical and cultural links to United Kingdom (UK) and the United States.

It has been a huge cultural challenge for Norwegian authorities to adapt to a security situation without any specific enemy nation state. The intellectual process to the Norwegian Minister of Defense's statement that it is enough to have something to protect to maintain relevant armed forces<sup>20</sup>, has been long lasting and troublesome. Current defense policy is based on a continuing membership in NATO, reliable relation and cooperation with Russia and contribution to international peace and stability<sup>21</sup>. The Government's policy is consistent with the international system of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but recent public discussion may question whether contribution to international operation has domestic political support.

International operations have, in different modes, been a natural part of Army history since 1641<sup>22</sup>. In recent history, and after the contribution to stabilize and rebuild Germany after WW II, the policy changed in the 1960's to a more national approach, continuing to build the nation and to protect national territory. The Kosovo War led to a new change, where Norwegian forces were made available to NATO for more offensive operations and out of area operations<sup>23</sup>. After decades of contribution to peace-keeping

operations, the spectrum of operations changed and required forces available for war fighting intensity.

All changes are a question of time, whether it has become a culture, a preferred way of doing things, or not. The discussion before the deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that there are different political positions within both the Parliament and the Government. This situation is not unlike the situation in other European countries, and is in my view a sign of a well working democracy. The committee of Defense policy – a governmental cross party line committee – does go a step further in its report of 31 October 2007, and recommends an even stronger focus on Norway's contribution to international operations<sup>24</sup>. Further on the committee recommend to develop and also use other elements of power, and gain a more effective interagency approach to international contributions. So far it is only a recommendation, but do support my understanding that the main political body favors, and in fact is willing to increase, Norwegian contribution to international operations.

Norway is one of the best working democracies<sup>25</sup>. Policy change is a slow process, but when implemented it reflects the majority of the population's will. One of the best criteria to measure the populations support is the concept of conscripts. The concept has a strong position in the Norwegian society, and based on last year's recruitment to international operations, there is a strong support to present defense policy among the majority of the Norwegian population.

The Norwegian security and defense policy depend on the UN and NATO as reliable international actors, and support a further development of EU's security arrangements<sup>26</sup>. There is a common political will to use military force as a legitimate

element of power; Not necessarily in number of soldiers, but in the whole spectrum of operations world wide and as part of international organizations. Use of Norwegian military force has to be legitimate in accordance with international law, and Norway highly supports all UN reforms to develop international laws and a legitimate use of force. The Northern European areas maintain political priority, and the interest at stake will decide Norwegian contribution to other areas. The policy highlights the use of military element of power, and there is no official policy to integrate other elements of power to enhance the contributions to international operations.

### Norwegian Armed Forces

Having discussed the international system and Norwegian policy's relevance to it, it is time to verify the political requirements to the armed forces. In this chapter I will discuss the armed forces in detail, both to challenge my thesis and to recommend adjustments to enable a better coherence between political will and military capability. I assume that the easy way, increased financial budgets, is not an option and I will not include this alternative in my further discussions. The 2004 White Paper describes an Army with one deployable Brigade able to maintain one international mission, a battalion size unit, in 3-5 years in addition to one deployable battalion size unit at high readiness<sup>27</sup>.

By November 2007, two battalion size units are deployed to Afghanistan and one battalion is at high readiness alert in Norway. In addition, Norway, together with Sweden, has signed up to deploy a battalion size engineer unit primo 2008 for the UN mission in Sudan<sup>28</sup>. These are all small battalions in numbers of boots on the ground, but the number of combat service support, service support and command elements are



independent of the boots on the ground, and stretch the capacity severely. According to the White Paper, this is far beyond what the Army is given resources to maintain, and will spread a small capacity to three continents.

There are three political requirements which limit the alternatives to create a better balance between political ambitions and Army capacity. *First*, the system of conscripts is to be maintained<sup>29</sup>. *Second*, deployable forces are to be robust and capable of high intensity operations<sup>30</sup>. *Third*, it is more important to contribute with substantial units over time in each mission, than short term engagements<sup>31</sup>. With these requirements, what kind of opportunities do we have to improve the coherence between political ambitions and the Army capacity?

The force generation process is in principle based on a 12 months cycle, where the first four months are basic training of each soldier. After six months the units have capacity to conduct national Crisis Response Operations (CRO), and after 12 months units are deployable as combined arms team. One of the core challenges, and the reason why twelve months is needed to become deployable, is the lack of experience and continuity at platoon and company level. After 12 months, each soldier either signs up for a short term contract and deploys to one of the ongoing missions, or sign up for a long term contract as full time soldier in one of the high readiness units. In addition, the NCOs are recruited out of the best conscripts, and the ambition is to achieve a turn over of minimum 7 years, with maximum service until the age of 35 years. As of today, there do not seem to be any major challenges to recruit required number of soldiers, but we do have a challenge to keep the personnel on short term contracts deployable after their first rotation.

After the Cold War, the Army reserve organization was dismantled in order to increase the quality. Today quantity has become vital to enable quality, and the need for an available reserve organization is more important than ever. I do not believe that a reestablishment of a separate reserve organization is appropriate. By the constitution it is voluntary to sign up for more than 12 months service and deployments to international operations. As in all organizations, the key is to establish a culture where each soldier has a strong sense of belonging and identity, and where it is a personal dedication and honor to serve as a member of a dedicated unit. These personal issues, identity and belonging, are most easily enhanced within the frame of a battalion organization. As a result, the time cycle of each battalion has to be extended beyond the 12 months cycle of today to enable administration of both conscripts and professional soldiers on short and long term contracts. This will give each battalion an optimized mixture of experience and enable regularly deployments without the need to deploy core personnel once a year as most of the units do today.

The number of deployable battalion units is vital to sustain long term engagements and required number of missions. As of today, the Army has a high readiness capacity 24/7, allocated in one unit with personnel on long term contracts<sup>32</sup>. This unit has capacity to deploy as a combined arms team world wide on short notice, and is probably among the best maneuver units in Europe to do so. For a small army, with a political ambition to contribute with substantial elements world wide in long lasting missions, it is a question of readiness versus quantity.

Development of NATO force structure affects Norwegian force structure directly, and the establishment of NATO Response Force (NRF)<sup>33</sup> has vital implications on our

force generation process. NRF has a regular rhythm where each nation contributes in specific periods, leaving the forces available for other missions in between. At the same time, the capacity for national crises response has increased dramatically by adjusting the force generation process into two equal parts every six months. In my view, this is a risk assessment of army capabilities. The quality of units with a balanced mixture of personnel categories and experience are at an acceptable level to conduct all types of operations. In some cases they will need more time to prepare for all types of operations, but fully within NATO force requirements by prolonging the planning horizon of the force generation process. One way to increase the sustainability is therefore to make the whole force structure available to all missions, contribution to NRF included. One consequence is that the strategic leadership has to conduct continuous risk assessments and prioritize between readiness and quantity.

The ability to conduct enduring operations of all intensities is at the brigade level. At this level, all branch capacities merge into a system of systems and create the ability to conduct independent operations within a certain matter of time. In a joint and combined perspective, this is also the basic system which has the ability to effectively plan and use all available resources. Force generating of battalion systems has to be conducted in a brigade frame, both to create a realistic environment and to enable high intensity operations. Qualifications and credibility at this level will over time be vital, and it has to prove its qualifications to remain reliable. In a system where all elements are to deploy, it will therefore be necessary to deploy the Brigade HQ with supporting elements to maintain this capacity over a longer period of time. Norway will only be able to deploy an independent Brigade when interests of survival importance are at stake. In

the security environment of today, deployment of Brigade HQ has to be part of a long term planning horizon and in a bilateral or multilateral cooperation, where Norway is in lead for a specific period of time.

One of the conclusions in my discussion of the international system in the 21<sup>st</sup> century was the need to create coalitions to enable timely responses to different situations. Alan Ryan underlines this assumption in his discussion of the Australian led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) operation in East Timor 1999<sup>34</sup>. He states that the success of this operation was due to the UN subcontracting the execution to Australia, enabling a common United Nation Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to gain necessary time to prepare and deploy into a facilitated situation. This is an excellent example of the international organizations', and especial the UN, challenges of today, but gives also the way ahead to achieve effect and efficiency within multinational cooperation.

One of Sir Michael Rose's lessons from Bosnia was that a military force can only be effective within a credible political and social framework<sup>35</sup>. This further evidence of today's complexity and challenges, but is totally in accordance with Clausewitz's theory of trinity; a coherent balance between population, politics and Army<sup>36</sup>. Clausewitz discussed the nation state's trinity, and the main challenge today is to project this trinity into a coalition of several nation states. How can a small state, like Norway, become a full worthy member of future coalitions? To answer this question I will discuss present cooperation within ongoing operations, the generic requirements and international organizations ability to maintain future frames which enable timely coalitions. National culture will be an important factor, and due to my assumption that some nations

cooperate more easily than other, I will discuss nations that Norway should emphasize to have a more consistent cooperation with.

Afghanistan is Norway's prioritized area of operation and contributes with a quick reaction force (QRF) and a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) under German command<sup>37</sup>. The QRF is a national unit and Germany supports the operations with vital force multipliers. Norway is lead nation for the PRT, and until summer of 2007 with support from Finland. Today Finland has reorganized its contribution and Latvia is the only nation contributing with tactical capacities. As of today, Norway has only observers and single officers deployed in UN operations, but have signed up with Sweden to deploy a multinational engineer battalion to Sudan primo 2008. On a more permanent basis, Norway has for several years had a relative huge number of staff officers integrated in the German- Netherland Corps. This Corps HQ is one of NATO's seven High Readiness Forces (Land) Headquarters, and alternates between commanding the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and as land component command of the NATO Response Force<sup>38</sup>. My discussion so far demonstrates that Norway is heavily involved in multinational cooperation, but the question is whether this cooperation has any relevance with the future requirements? This has to be verified both with regard to the national need to maintain capacity at all levels and ability to contribute in future coalitions.

David C. Gompert and Uwe Nerlich discuss the trends after the Cold War, and the increasing gap of capabilities between the U.S. and major European nation states<sup>39</sup>. They state that this is due to a different approach, where the European countries mainly have focused on stabilization operations. The result is a decreased ability to conduct

multinational operations and to form timely transatlantic coalitions. Being aware of the U.S.'s dominant role as the only NATO member with all capacities available to conduct high intensity operations, they suggest a closer cooperation in different areas. They recommend that major European nations should reestablish their focus on full spectrum operations. In addition an extended planning horizon is advised, and to establish a closer link between European and US transformation.

A report from the TechNet Asia-Pacific seminar in 2004 discuss future war fighting in the Asia-Pacific region, and emphasis the technology needs within future coalitions<sup>40</sup>. The most dominant issues are related to security within a multinational organization and the need to maintain a common operational picture including the shear of intelligence. Roger H. Palin includes in his discussion of Multinational Forces; problems and prospects, most of the recommendations mentioned above<sup>41</sup>. He goes even further and states a number of issues which have to be in place to enable an effective multinational force structure. Fixed cooperation on all levels, harmonized doctrines and mutually understood operating procedures are emphasized as vital issues together with interoperability and interchangeability of main equipments and force elements. Lessons from decades of multinational operations have examples where most of these requirements have not been fulfilled, and we have experienced both successes and failures. In my further discussion, main focus is to verify which of the international organizations that have potential to facilitate these requirements.

Norway heavily supports the UN's effort to remain a major security actor in the international system, and has historically had substantial contributions to several operations<sup>42</sup>. The UN has conducted military operations since its birth, but the

experiences differ from partly success to disastrous. Sir Michael Rose experience from Bosnia, emphasis the need of a clear mandate, both with regard to what to do and what the force is not supposed to do<sup>43</sup>. This is one of the core challenges with UN led operations, the ability to adapt to a dynamic situation, and maintain the ability to change modus operandi. In that case, I do support Roger H. Palin assessment that the UN is unfit to conduct operations that exceed peace-keeping intensity, both because of its lack of a relevant military command structure and because of the fundamental principle of neutrality<sup>44</sup>.

The EU security arrangements have a quite short history, and the first EU battle group is to be operational in 2008. Even though the organization is responsible for the ongoing operation in Bosnia, it is a basic principle that the EU is to be in support of NATO and to establish only crisis response capacity, able to conduct low intensity operations. At the same time, there is a clear tendency that European security issues are discussed both in EU and NATO, and for Norway, as a non EU member, this is a huge challenge. As of today, EU does not meet the requirements to frame future coalitions, but seems to remain a vital arena for political discussions. NATO is the only organization with a fixed military structure, and with implementation of the decided reforms the organization has potential to remain relevant in the international security system of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As discussed earlier, US will remain a dominant actor, and the organization will have to adapt to a more flexible and dynamic environment to survive. This new situation will force small nations to fulfill their commitments, and with decreasing budget, multilateral cooperation within a NATO frame seems to be a highly relevant way to go.

I do believe that some countries cooperate more easily than others, and that history and culture affect our behavior seriously. Richard D. Lewis compares the different cultures in the Cultural Types model<sup>45</sup>, and according to his discussion, it is a dedicated advantage to keep the cooperation within certain limits if effect and efficiency are important issues. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs has announced an increased cooperation with Sweden<sup>46</sup>, and we are in process to generate a common multinational battalion under UN command. Norway is a huge user of Swedish military material, and there is a great potential to achieve interoperability and interchangeability with regard to materiel and force elements. The main problem with non-NATO members, such as Sweden, is related to security issues, making it nearly impossible to achieve a common situational picture in high intensity operations.

We do have strong historical links to both UK and the U.S., but as major actors they have national interests in most of the future areas of operations. Roger H. Palin discuss this issue, and highly emphasize that Lead nations, in multinational forces, should not have national interests in the area of operation<sup>47</sup>. If we go to multinational cooperation within the other services, the Air Force has had a close cooperation with Denmark, Netherland and Belgium since the decision to buy F-16 from the U.S. A similar Army cooperation will meet most of the requirements, and especially Norway and Netherland has as small states a lot in common both with regard to culture, doctrines and material. In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a bilateral agreement between the two countries was discussed, but halted of several reasons. Due to my discussions of the requirements for effective coalitions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there seems



to be good reasons to renew those discussions in order to establish a more consistent cooperation.

### Recommendations

At this point of my discussion, I will emphasize my thesis of a higher political will to contribute to international operations than the will to maintain a sustainable force structure. I have during my discussions verified the political will, and it seems to be growing, without any visible effect on the will to maintain a sustainable force structure. There is a gap between the will to contribute and the will to adequately fund the force needed to support the political will, *and I made early the assumption that increased budgets were not a relevant alternative in this study.* There are two main areas where this gap may be reduced in order to increase sustainability and, for Norway, to remain a relevant and reliable actor in the international system of 21<sup>st</sup> century. *First*, I recommend that the Army adjust the force generating process and national requirements that seem to be too resource-draining compared to effective output.

- The time to prepare a battalion unit has to be reduced from 12 months today to as close to 6 months as possible. To enable this, each unit need more full time soldiers, and the number of experienced NCOs has to increase. This is vital to decrease the time necessary for pure education, and make more time available for full spectrum unit training and preparation between rotations and deployments.
- The number of conscripts and full time soldiers are not large enough to maintain a sustainable force structure. The Reserve Organization has to be reestablished, and I recommend that this is done within the frame of existing

battalions. The cycle of each battalion has to increase and enable administration and training of all categories, reserves included. I do not recommend reestablishing a separate reserve organization, rather to integrate the functions in each battalion, and create a flexible and dynamic local environment of identity and belonging.




Figure 1. Present and recommended balance of personnel categories.

- The number of available battalions is crucial to achieve the political goals. It is possible to increase this number by adjusting the national requirements of having a continuously high readiness force available for NATO, and refocus this task in rhythm with NRF rotations. This will enable a more balanced level of experience in the whole force structure and facilitate the two previous recommendations. The consequence is an increased need of risk assessments at the strategic level with regard to quality and readiness and requires a high quality long term planning process.

	Bn 1	Bn 2	Bn 3	Bn 4
Training	X			
Readiness		X		
Deployed			X	
Recondition				X

Figure 2. Rotation of tasks and units<sup>48</sup>

- It is vital to maintain ability to conduct full spectrum operations, and credibility at the Brigade level is essential to enable this. The Brigade level has to be a part of the deployment rotations, and as a small nation, this will only be possible in a multinational frame with bilateral or multilateral arrangements between relevant nation states.

I have focused on four main adjustments, and three of them are mutually reliant to each other. None of them rely on increased budgets, rather a balancing of available resources to a broader part of the structure to increase quantity and maintain vital capacity. The *second part* of my recommendations is related to the international cooperation, and the ability to remain a reliable actor in the international security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

NATO is the only international organization which has any potential to accommodate the future security requirements. The U.S will remain the dominant actor in European security issues, and as of today, NATO is the only arena for transatlantic cooperation. It is important to recognize that the U.S is the only single actor in the alliance with all capabilities to conduct full spectrum operations, and I recommend a closer link to the U.S transformation in order to maintain national full spectrum competencies.

I have discussed NATO's challenges to become an effective military organization, and the enlargement to a 26 member alliance has not made the situation any better. The differences between the member states have increased dramatically with regard to interoperable equipment, doctrines, and language skills, and it will take long time for the new members to become fully operational according to existing NATO standards. At the

same time, substantial contributions and long term engagements are challenging to sustain for small nations unilaterally. I strongly believe that a consistent multilateral cooperation between small nation states in fixed force structures can enhance both the single nation's and NATO's capabilities.

I made my own experiences as commanding officer of a multinational battalion in Afghanistan 2004. Norway had a Brigade Quick Reaction Force company deployed, and was asked by NATO to be lead nation and establish a multinational battle group together with Belgium and Hungary. The task was accomplished with support of a U.S company and Brigade assets, and proved that small nations, when working together, have potential to contribute with substantial forces at a higher level of command than possible with a unilateral approach. In addition to solve the operational requirements, the task was highly relevant for the development of the Army force structure, attaining multinational combined arms experience. This is one important lesson learned; contribution to an international operation has to be relevant for the long term development of the national force structure. Due to my experiences, it is also important to be aware of the limitations. The operation was static within a limited area of operations, and the dominant part of the operations were executed at platoon and company level. To enable more complex operations at a higher level of command and intensity, some other lessons learned have to be emphasized:

- NATO has an integrated command structure<sup>49</sup>, but each nation state limits the use of force to restricted areas, types of operation and chain of command as some examples. I fully understand the nation state's need to maintain national control, that is the nature of politics, but caveats which limits the multinational

unit's ability to achieve agreed objectives are contra productive. Within an alliance, it should be possible to avoid this by a more consistent multilateral cooperation, enabling mutual understanding and trust between the nation states. This may be challenging to achieve immediately with all 26 countries, and it will be necessary to make it a long term NATO goal. On short term, culturally equal nation states, which meet the generic requirements<sup>50</sup>, should establish a consistent cooperation in fixed force structures.

- One of the most important success criteria is to establish a common situational picture, and the ability to conduct intelligence guided operations. Common procedures, chain of rapport and a multinational Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) element are all vital elements. Based on my experience, I do question NATO's overall ability to create a common situational picture. Most nations do not transfer command of their intelligence assets, and keep them as national assets, focusing on force protection of own forces. This creates a lot of challenges for the multinational units, and intelligence processed through the multinational chain of command is too often either history or irrelevant to ongoing operations. It is a lot of reasons to this, but one of the main issues is lack of trust between the high numbers of contributing nation states.
- Logistic is according to NATO doctrine a national responsibility. Different equipment, national responsibility for own infrastructure, different leave periods and time of deployments, makes the number of boots on the ground relatively small according to the total number of soldiers in the area of operations.

Common regulations and multinational logistic elements are one of the most effective ways to increase the efficiency.

- NATO force generation process is conducted twice a year, and relies on the single member states will to contribute with required capacities. It is quite normal that the order of battle for each mission is decided just in time for the transfer of command. This leaves no time for common combined preparations, and limits the use of force more than necessary. Annually NATO conducts the Defense Planning Questionnaire process to set the short and long term force structure goals, and this process has to be coherent with the force generation process.

I have already discussed culturally equal nation states and their advantages in multinational force structures. In a consistent and long term cooperation at all levels, they have together the potential to deploy and sustain effective multinational combined arms teams at battalion and brigade level. Initially, a credible political and social network has to be established and agreed upon between the nation states. The agreement must include a common set of limitations and regulations, and has to be maintained by a working group of all nation states throughout the operation.




Figure 3. Multinational Force Structure<sup>51</sup>

When deployed, each nation should transfer units in OPCON<sup>52</sup> or OPCOM to the multinational command structure, including intelligence assets, enabling effective use of all available forces.

The Combined Arms Team (CAT) is a highly effective system of systems, where synergy and effect is created in the dynamic of seamless cooperation between units and levels. The effect relies on common procedures and highly developed personal relations between commanders at all levels. A multinational unit has to have interoperable equipment and procedures, and conduct regularly combined exercises. NATO's own multinational Response Force has the same ambition, but in lack of consensus, the force structure has never been deployed to ongoing operation. Norway is already an integrated part of the German/Netherlands Corps staff, and I recommend using this force structure as an umbrella for consistent cooperation at Brigade and Battalion level. This has already been done once, as part of NRF, with great success. To succeed, Norway has to work proactively both within the NATO environment and bilaterally with relevant nation states.




Figure 4. Combined Arms Team (CAT)<sup>53</sup>

Critics will say that there is nothing new in my recommendations, and truly Norway has tried to do this before. The Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) and the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military peace Support (NORCAPS) are force structures based on the same principles, but none has the potential to conduct operations above peace-keeping intensity. These force structures have been initiated at the political level, aiming to increase the ability to conduct and sustain peace keeping operations. So far the military effect has been limited, and I believe that the main reasons are the high number of nation states with dividing interests, equipment and lack of interoperability.

Use of non military elements of power is a highly effective way to reduce the gap between an unsupportable political will to contribute to the development of the international security environment, and the political will to maintain a sustainable military force structure. Other elements of power have to become an integrated part of Norway's contributions to international operations, and used in synergy with the military element. Historically, the non-military elements of power have been used separately as national humanitarian aid to single nation states or linked to specific UN projects and initiatives. If my assessment of the international security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is about right, it will force Norway to reassess present policy. Humanitarian aid and support to UN projects will remain vital elements of Norwegian policy, but to succeed, all elements of power has to be used in synergy to reestablish Afghanistan as a sovereign nation state.

NATO, the UN and the EU are all vital international organizations in Norwegian security and defense policy, but the contributions have to be prioritized to meet the



future requirements. From a military perspective, NATO has to have priority with contribution into fixed force structures. Separate UN and EU missions are, in this case, secondary and have to be assessed case by case. The UN will play a vital role legitimating future military actions, and the EU will remain a dominant political and economical actor. Norway should enhance a further cooperation between the EU and NATO, and initiate a closer link between the use of NATO's military assets and the EU's non kinetic elements of power. This will increase Europe's overall capability severely, and enable Norway, as a non EU member, to contribute with its huge non kinetic resources in an effective multinational frame.

### Conclusion

I started my discussion with a quote from President John F. Kennedy, and this is still wisdom to bear in mind for all strategic leaders. At the same time, we need to recognize that history tells us where, and why, we are, an important baseline to predict the future. To reduce the gap between the political will to contribute to the international security environment and the will to sustain a balanced force structure, I have recommended adjustments both with regard to internal army procedures and international relations.

The Army has to balance the use of conscripts in all units, and reserve personnel have to become a formalized part of the battalions' force structure. All tasks should be rotated between all units, and Brigade units and HQ has to deploy regularly. To maintain a balanced force structure and to sustain ongoing operations, Norway has to establish a more consistent cooperation with other small nation in fixed force structures within NATO. The goal is to deploy effective multinational CAT at Brigade and Battalion

level, and I recommend using the GE/NE Corps as an umbrella for this fixed force structure. NATO need to establish a better coherence between the force goals and force generation processes, and Norway should enhance more synergy between the use of NATO's military force structure and EU's non military elements of power.

My recommendations will increase levels of contributions, enable competencies for full spectrum operations, and national and NATO sustainability, which in order will enhance Norway's credibility in the 21<sup>st</sup> century's international system. The national control and flexibility of the military element of power will decrease, and we have to accept that the Army has reached a point where quantity is quality by itself.

For this paper I decided not to assume any increased budgets, which has been a Governmental tool to force the armed forces to transform into a new international reality. This has been an effective policy, and continuously transformation will be necessary also in the future. So far, the defense policy has been a matter of finance and efficiency, and it is time to start talking about national effects and credibility in the international system. It is a word saying that you get what you pay for. Norwegians highly value freedom, liberty and the superior way of life, now it seems like we have to pay more to maintain these values in the future.

### Endnotes

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<sup>48</sup> Figure 3 demonstrate the need to balance existing tasks between all available units. Another battalion, battalion 4, will also enable a better balance between tasks and available units, and establish a better ratio between deployments and time at home. This will probably create a need for more resources, and demonstrate in this paper only present unbalance between tasks and available units.

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<sup>53</sup> The figure demonstrates the interaction between the levels and the mutual reliance between subunits at each level.

